On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences (Q1194267): Difference between revisions
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Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation / rank | |||
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Property / cites work: Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 12:08, 16 May 2024
scientific article
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English | On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences |
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On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences (English)
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27 September 1992
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The purpose of this paper is to characterize the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences in fairly general settings. More specifically, the author successfully extends Danilov's conditions for Nash implementation in that the set of alternatives is now arbitrary and the domain of preferences consists of all weak orders. It remains to be seen, however, how this type of abstract model can be applied to real economic environments.
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social choice
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Nash implementation
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weak orders
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