On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences (Q1194267): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Added link to MaRDI item.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / MaRDI profile type
 
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 12:08, 16 May 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
scientific article

    Statements

    On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    27 September 1992
    0 references
    The purpose of this paper is to characterize the class of Nash implementable social choice correspondences in fairly general settings. More specifically, the author successfully extends Danilov's conditions for Nash implementation in that the set of alternatives is now arbitrary and the domain of preferences consists of all weak orders. It remains to be seen, however, how this type of abstract model can be applied to real economic environments.
    0 references
    social choice
    0 references
    Nash implementation
    0 references
    weak orders
    0 references

    Identifiers