A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems (Q1350573): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1
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+W2061099968
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+Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
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