Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges (Q1272626): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Salvador Barberá / rank
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Latest revision as of 17:44, 28 May 2024

scientific article
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Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
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    Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges (English)
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    25 May 1999
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    strategy-proof social choice functions
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    generalized median voter schemes
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