Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods (Q1809494): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Rajat K. Deb / rank
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Property / author: Rajat K. Deb / rank
 
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Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2560 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W4214485253 / rank
 
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Auction-like mechanisms for pricing excludable public goods
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