Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games (Q1125572): Difference between revisions

This paper suggests a model for understanding some of the puzzles and paradoxes of extensive analysis. The authors claims are supported by a collection of results related to the notion of common certainty of rationality in two-player multistage games with observed actions. It is an interesting paper.

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zbMATH Keywords

extensive analysis

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rationality

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multistage games

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reviewed by

Prabhat Kumar Mahanti

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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cites work

Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality

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A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

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Q4955434

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Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games

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Rationalizable Strategic Behavior

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Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge

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Real Analysis and Probability

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Q2816007

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Q3107917

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Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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Coherent beliefs are not always types.

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Topology-free typology of beliefs

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Q4323294

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Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information

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Multistage Games with Communication

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Q3576736

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Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection

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Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria

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Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information

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On a new axiomatic theory of probability

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Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information

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Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction

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The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

0972.91020

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DOI

10.1006/jeth.1999.2555

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:1125572

@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2167649812
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2167649812 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4955434
@@ Property / cites work: Q4955434 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
@@ Property / cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
@@ Property / cites work: Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Real Analysis and Probability
@@ Property / cites work: Real Analysis and Probability / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q2816007
@@ Property / cites work: Q2816007 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3107917
@@ Property / cites work: Q3107917 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Coherent beliefs are not always types.
@@ Property / cites work: Coherent beliefs are not always types. / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Topology-free typology of beliefs
@@ Property / cites work: Topology-free typology of beliefs / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4323294
@@ Property / cites work: Q4323294 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multistage Games with Communication
@@ Property / cites work: Multistage Games with Communication / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3576736
@@ Property / cites work: Q3576736 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On a new axiomatic theory of probability
@@ Property / cites work: On a new axiomatic theory of probability / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
+Normal rank