Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency (Q5952425): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 21:13, 3 June 2024

scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1688918
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English
Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1688918

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    Conflict and cooperation. The structure of equilibrium payoffs in common agency (English)
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    6 November 2002
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    This study represents an important contribution to the theory and applications of common agency. Thus, it contains strong results concerning the structure of equilibrium payoffs, being based on the payoff of the agents and on the evaluation of the immediate effects in the corresponding competition. The theoretical considerations are very well illustrated by the applications including the direct economic influences, the competitions for appropriate inputs and auctions.
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    common agency
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    equilibrium payoffs
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    truthful equilibria
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