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Latest revision as of 13:39, 5 June 2024

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Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
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    Strong belief and forward induction reasoning. (English)
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    2 April 2003
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    The authors provide a unified epistemic analysis of some forward-induction solution concepts in games with complete and incomplete information. They suggest that forward induction reasoning may be usefully interpreted as a set of assumptions governing the players' belief revision processes. They define a concept of strong belief and provide an epistemic characterization, and sufficient epistemic conditions for the backward induction outcome in generic games with perfect information.
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    conditional belief
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    strong belief
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    forward induction
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    rationalizability
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    intuitive
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    criterion.
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