A solution to the problem of consumption externalities. (Q1415908): Difference between revisions

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+Coalition-proof implementation
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+Normal rank
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+Q5588318
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+Normal rank
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+Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
+Normal rank
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+Nash-Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence with Decreasing Returns to Scale Technologies
+Normal rank
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+Q3757645
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+Normal rank
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+Q3901249
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+Normal rank
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+Subgame Perfect Implementation
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+Normal rank
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+Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
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+Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
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+Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondence by a Single-Valued, Feasible, and Continuous Mechanism
+Normal rank
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+Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
+Normal rank
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+Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
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+Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer
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+Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism
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+Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
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+On the informational size of message spaces
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+Normal rank
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+Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
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