Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings (Q798345): Difference between revisions
From MaRDI portal
Created a new Item |
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs) Changed an Item |
||
(5 intermediate revisions by 4 users not shown) | |||
Property / reviewed by | |||
Property / reviewed by: Michael Hager / rank | |||
Property / reviewed by | |||
Property / reviewed by: Michael Hager / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0097-3165(84)90056-6 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2001980959 / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives / rank | |||
Normal rank | |||
links / mardi / name | links / mardi / name | ||
Latest revision as of 13:47, 14 June 2024
scientific article
Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
---|---|---|---|
English | Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings |
scientific article |
Statements
Every finite distributive lattice is a set of stable matchings (English)
0 references
1984
0 references
Each of 2n people, n men and n women, has a linear preference ordering on those of the opposite sex. A matching, i.e. forming n couples, is called stable if one cannot find a woman in one couple and a man in another who would prefer each other to their present partners. The set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice by defining a partial ordering as follows: one matching is \(\geq\) another if every man is at least as happy with his partner in the first matching as in the second. In this note the author shows that each finite distributive lattice can be represented by a set of stable matchings.
0 references
preference ordering
0 references
stable matchings
0 references
finite distributive lattice
0 references