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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90104-9 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 18:21, 17 June 2024

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Robust trading mechanisms
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    Robust trading mechanisms (English)
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    1987
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    We consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information. It is shown that posted-price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy. A posted-price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade.
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    trading institution
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    single buyer and seller
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    private information
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    posted-price mechanisms
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    dominant strategy
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