Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model (Q1820991): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(86)90072-6 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 19:18, 17 June 2024

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Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
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    Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model (English)
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    1986
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    The authors analyze a problem of stable matching as a generalization action of the stable marriage problem. They assume that a criterion for ranking partners accepted by all participants exists. E.g., in college dormatories students might rank possible roommates according to the distances between each others home towns. The authors show that unique stable matching exists if preferences are single peaked and narcissistic in that each individual considers his own ''position'' in the sense of the criterion (e.g. the location of his own home town) to be best. Moreover, a method to detect whether preferences are single peaked is presented.
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    single peaked preferences
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    stable matching
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    stable marriage problem
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