Perfect sequential equilibrium (Q1821707): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 19:31, 17 June 2024

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Perfect sequential equilibrium
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    Perfect sequential equilibrium (English)
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    1986
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    Our equilibrium concept is a restriction of sequential equilibrium. A player chooses a ''metastrategy'' which specifies his act as a function of his belief. This permits players to evaluate how a game will evolve if new beliefs are assigned to a given node, and enables us to develop a restriction on the beliefs ''off the equilibrium path''. A perfect sequential equilibrium is supported by beliefs p which prevent a player from deviating to an unreached node, when there is no belief q which, when assigned to the node, makes it optimal for a deviation to occur with probability q.
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    metastrategy
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    perfect sequential equilibrium
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