A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems (Q581198): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:30, 18 June 2024

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A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems
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    A family of incentive-compatible and non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation problems (English)
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    1987
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    The class of interactive processes which unifies a large family of incentive-compatible, non-subsidizing optimal resource allocation algorithms is formalized. The equations of motion are defined by the linear combination of reported marginal profits. The conditions on the matrix of motion ensure convergence, feasibility and optimality of the process. The process can be made compatible and non-subsidizing by imposing an appropriate tax rate on each user.
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    incentive compatibility
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    linear dynamic systems
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    optimal resource allocation
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    tax rate
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