Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules (Q583067): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:58, 20 June 2024

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Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules
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    Undominated candidate strategies under alternative voting rules (English)
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    1989
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    In the study of usual alternative voting rules the author formulates four different definitions of domination of candidates in ballots, provided a profile of voters' weak preferences is given: Pareto domination, just domination, plurality domination and covering domination. For all found kinds of domination the author gives their weak versions. He proves three theorems establishing relations between sets satisfying these four kinds of domination. In conclusion the author discusses the practical importance of his results for the estimation of different voting rules.
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    voting rules
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    domination of candidates
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    ballots
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    Pareto domination
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    just domination
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    plurality domination
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    covering domination
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