``How characteristic are characteristic functions?'' (Q2641230): Difference between revisions

An effectivity function E and a utility-function profile h give rise to the associated side-payment game v(E,h) and also to the associated non- side-payment game V(E,h). The first result shows the equivalence of the following three conditions on two effectivity functions E and \(E'\) having the same player set and the same outcome space: (i) for every h, \(v(E,h)=v(E',h)\); (ii) for every h, \(V(E,h)=V(E',h)\); (iii) for a subset C of the outcome space, [there exists \(B\in E(S)\) for which \(B\subset C]\) iff [there exists \(B'\in E'(S)\) for which \(B'\subset C]\). Similar considerations are given for the case in which players choose probabilities on the outcomes. Let \({\mathcal F}_{TU}(E):=\{v(E,h)| h\}\). A property of effectivity function E is called TU-characterizable, if it is characterized as a property of \({\mathcal F}_{TU}(E)\). Several properties of an effectivity function are proved to be TU- characterizable. Several properties of an effectivity function E are also proved to be NTU-characterizable.