Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games (Q2491878): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 16:30, 24 June 2024

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Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games
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    Markov equilibria in dynamic matching and bargaining games (English)
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    29 May 2006
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    bargaining
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    competition
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    Markov-perfect equilibrium
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    random matching
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