Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets (Q857978): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 11:55, 25 June 2024

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Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
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    Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets (English)
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    5 January 2007
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