The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (Q2482637): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:06, 27 June 2024

scientific article
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The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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    The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (English)
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    23 April 2008
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    Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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    double auction
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    participation fees
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    asymptotic efficiency
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