Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences (Q930485): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / cites work @@
+Voting by Committees
@@ Property / cites work: Voting by Committees / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count
@@ Property / cites work: Non-manipulable domains for the Borda count / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
@@ Property / cites work: Collective choice under dichotomous preferences / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3323629
@@ Property / cites work: Q3323629 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Borda count and agenda manipulation
@@ Property / cites work: The Borda count and agenda manipulation / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Approval voting and positional voting methods: inference, relationship, examples
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
+Normal rank