Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach (Q732930): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.003 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 02:02, 2 July 2024

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Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
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    Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach (English)
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    15 October 2009
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    social choice theory
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    preference aggregation theory
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    Wilson's theorem
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    Arrow's theorem
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    pivotal voters
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