Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts (Q1036602): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.007
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+W2142558139
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+College admissions with affirmative action
@@ Property / cites work: College admissions with affirmative action / rank @@
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+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
@@ Property / cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem / rank @@
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+The Impossibility of Bayesian Group Decision Making with Separate Aggregation of Beliefs and Values
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+The law of aggregate demand and welfare in the two-sided matching market
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+On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
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+The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model
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+Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
@@ Property / cites work: Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange / rank @@
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
@@ Property / cites work: Q3999327 / rank @@
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+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
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+Publication:1036602