Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions (Q993785): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 06:25, 3 July 2024

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Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
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    Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions (English)
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    20 September 2010
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    The authors study ways of simplifying mechanisms by restricting its message space, and the connection with Nash equilibria.
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    sponsored search
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    generalized second-price auctions
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    mechanism design
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