Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth (Q542124): Difference between revisions

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Property / author: Jonathan Alexander Zvesper / rank
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Property / author
 
Property / author: Jonathan Alexander Zvesper / rank
 
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This survey presents a variety of newer modal logics, such as epistemic logic, dynamic epistemic logic, public announcement logic, doxastic-epistemic logic, all of which try to model more closely the way in which thinking takes place in a social environment (``Although in many cases we do reason in isolation, there is clearly a natural multiagent component to much of our actual reasoning. This takes two forms: we reason about other people, and also with other people.''). This is seen as having originated with Hintikka (1962). Currently, the main proponents of these logics are J. van Benthem, A. Baltag, L. Moss, and the authors. Several of the cited works are Ph.D. dissertations. Although devoted to Beth's centenary, there is no reference to any work of Beth within the paper.
Property / review text: This survey presents a variety of newer modal logics, such as epistemic logic, dynamic epistemic logic, public announcement logic, doxastic-epistemic logic, all of which try to model more closely the way in which thinking takes place in a social environment (``Although in many cases we do reason in isolation, there is clearly a natural multiagent component to much of our actual reasoning. This takes two forms: we reason about other people, and also with other people.''). This is seen as having originated with Hintikka (1962). Currently, the main proponents of these logics are J. van Benthem, A. Baltag, L. Moss, and the authors. Several of the cited works are Ph.D. dissertations. Although devoted to Beth's centenary, there is no reference to any work of Beth within the paper. / rank
 
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Property / reviewed by: Victor V. Pambuccian / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03B42 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03B45 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03-03 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 01A60 / rank
 
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID
 
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 01A65 / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH DE Number
 
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 5905348 / rank
 
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dynamic logic
Property / zbMATH Keywords: dynamic logic / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
interaction
Property / zbMATH Keywords: interaction / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
information update
Property / zbMATH Keywords: information update / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
belief change
Property / zbMATH Keywords: belief change / rank
 
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Property / zbMATH Keywords
 
epistemology
Property / zbMATH Keywords: epistemology / rank
 
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game theory
Property / zbMATH Keywords: game theory / rank
 
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survey paper
Property / zbMATH Keywords: survey paper / rank
 
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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9779-2 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W2167685886 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 04:08, 4 July 2024

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Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth
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    Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth (English)
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    8 June 2011
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    This survey presents a variety of newer modal logics, such as epistemic logic, dynamic epistemic logic, public announcement logic, doxastic-epistemic logic, all of which try to model more closely the way in which thinking takes place in a social environment (``Although in many cases we do reason in isolation, there is clearly a natural multiagent component to much of our actual reasoning. This takes two forms: we reason about other people, and also with other people.''). This is seen as having originated with Hintikka (1962). Currently, the main proponents of these logics are J. van Benthem, A. Baltag, L. Moss, and the authors. Several of the cited works are Ph.D. dissertations. Although devoted to Beth's centenary, there is no reference to any work of Beth within the paper.
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    dynamic logic
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    interaction
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    information update
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    belief change
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    epistemology
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    game theory
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    survey paper
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