Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection (Q660107): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.004
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+W1497602759
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+Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
@@ Property / cites work: Global Games and Equilibrium Selection / rank @@
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+Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
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+Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example
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+The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
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+Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
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+On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games
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+Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
@@ Property / cites work: Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities / rank @@
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