Agreement toward stability in matching markets (Q766251): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 00:16, 5 July 2024

scientific article
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Agreement toward stability in matching markets
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    Agreement toward stability in matching markets (English)
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    23 March 2012
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    matching
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    lattice
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    unanimity
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    deferred acceptance algorithm
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