Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum (Q430916): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 10:21, 5 July 2024

scientific article
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Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum
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    Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum (English)
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    26 June 2012
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    approval balloting
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    Pareto efficiency
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    multiple elections
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    referendum
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    majority voting
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