A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting (Q2276554): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 21:00, 5 July 2024

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A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting
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    A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting (English)
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    6 November 2012
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    intertemporal trade
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    folk theorem
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    repeated game
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    unequal discounting
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