Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria (Q1925688): Difference between revisions

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Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.021 / rank
 
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Property / OpenAlex ID: W1967386364 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 00:44, 6 July 2024

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Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
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