Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types (Q1929140): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 02:19, 6 July 2024

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Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types
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    Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types (English)
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    7 January 2013
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    mechanism design
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    incentive compatibility
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    optimal contract
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    sub-utility function
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