Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings (Q361828): Difference between revisions
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This article deals with bidding rings in multiple auctions. A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude to control the bids in order to decrease the auction price for the suitable item. When no transfers are possible among members, the bidding ring is said to be weak, and it is strong when members can make side payments. The literature contains many theoretical works on bidding rings in single auctions. On the other hand, some empirical studies have shown the existence of bidding rings that cover several auction markets. The focus of the article is on bidding rings in the case of multiple auctions for both cases weak and strong. The authors analyse a collusive network of bidding rings acting at the same time in multiple markets. They consider a model consisting of \(N\) ex-ante symmetric risk-neutral bidders and assume that either all rings are weak or all rings are strong. They examine ``the ex-ante incentives of bidders, and demonstrate that these incentives led to the emergence of dominant groups, or stars and interlinked stars in equilibrium.'' Furthermore, they analyse ``the observable consequences for bidding behaviour of these architectures that not only allowed the detection of collusion but also permitted weak cartels to be distinguished from strong cartels.'' | |||
Property / review text: This article deals with bidding rings in multiple auctions. A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude to control the bids in order to decrease the auction price for the suitable item. When no transfers are possible among members, the bidding ring is said to be weak, and it is strong when members can make side payments. The literature contains many theoretical works on bidding rings in single auctions. On the other hand, some empirical studies have shown the existence of bidding rings that cover several auction markets. The focus of the article is on bidding rings in the case of multiple auctions for both cases weak and strong. The authors analyse a collusive network of bidding rings acting at the same time in multiple markets. They consider a model consisting of \(N\) ex-ante symmetric risk-neutral bidders and assume that either all rings are weak or all rings are strong. They examine ``the ex-ante incentives of bidders, and demonstrate that these incentives led to the emergence of dominant groups, or stars and interlinked stars in equilibrium.'' Furthermore, they analyse ``the observable consequences for bidding behaviour of these architectures that not only allowed the detection of collusion but also permitted weak cartels to be distinguished from strong cartels.'' / rank | |||
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Property / reviewed by | |||
Property / reviewed by: Youssef El-Khatib / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH DE Number | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6199394 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
weak rings | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: weak rings / rank | |||
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strong rings | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: strong rings / rank | |||
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private value auctions | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: private value auctions / rank | |||
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stars and interlinked stars | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: stars and interlinked stars / rank | |||
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dominant groups | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: dominant groups / rank | |||
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Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
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Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0709-z / rank | |||
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Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2027236350 / rank | |||
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Latest revision as of 19:13, 6 July 2024
scientific article
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English | Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings |
scientific article |
Statements
Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings (English)
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19 August 2013
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This article deals with bidding rings in multiple auctions. A bidding ring is a collection of bidders who collude to control the bids in order to decrease the auction price for the suitable item. When no transfers are possible among members, the bidding ring is said to be weak, and it is strong when members can make side payments. The literature contains many theoretical works on bidding rings in single auctions. On the other hand, some empirical studies have shown the existence of bidding rings that cover several auction markets. The focus of the article is on bidding rings in the case of multiple auctions for both cases weak and strong. The authors analyse a collusive network of bidding rings acting at the same time in multiple markets. They consider a model consisting of \(N\) ex-ante symmetric risk-neutral bidders and assume that either all rings are weak or all rings are strong. They examine ``the ex-ante incentives of bidders, and demonstrate that these incentives led to the emergence of dominant groups, or stars and interlinked stars in equilibrium.'' Furthermore, they analyse ``the observable consequences for bidding behaviour of these architectures that not only allowed the detection of collusion but also permitted weak cartels to be distinguished from strong cartels.''
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weak rings
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strong rings
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private value auctions
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stars and interlinked stars
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dominant groups
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