Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication (Q2442425): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2080588950
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2080588950 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Communication in Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Private Observation, Communication and Collusion
@@ Property / cites work: Private Observation, Communication and Collusion / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Folk theorem with communication
@@ Property / cites work: Folk theorem with communication / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Repeated proximity games.
@@ Property / cites work: Repeated proximity games. / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On Repeated Games with Complete Information
@@ Property / cites work: On Repeated Games with Complete Information / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4369410
@@ Property / cites work: Q4369410 / rank @@
+Normal rank