A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem' (Q462856): Difference between revisions

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+Q4495210
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+On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
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+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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+Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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+Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
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+Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
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+On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
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+The “rural hospital theorem” revisited
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+Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
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+On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
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+Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
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+Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model<sup>∗</sup>
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+On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model
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+An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
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+Random matching in the college admissions problem
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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+Q3999327
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+Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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+Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
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+Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
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