Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching (Q485428): Difference between revisions

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+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-014-0813-z
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+W2052215611
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+Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
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+A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
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+Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
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+Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
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+The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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+Optimal truncation in matching markets
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+Comparative statics in matching markets
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+The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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+In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm
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+Manipulation via capacities revisited
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Mixed strategies in games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
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+Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
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+The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
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+Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
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+Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
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+A note on job matching with budget constraints
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+Games of capacity allocation in many-to-one matching with an aftermarket
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
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+Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
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+Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
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+Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
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