When do creditors with heterogeneous beliefs agree to run? (Q2339117): Difference between revisions
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | When do creditors with heterogeneous beliefs agree to run? |
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When do creditors with heterogeneous beliefs agree to run? (English)
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30 March 2015
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The funding liquidity of a borrower that finances its operations through short-term debt is studied in this paper in a multiperiod setting. The problem is formalized as a coordination game and it is shown that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
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liquidity risk
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credit risk
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Nash equilibrium
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bank run
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