Informed seller with taste heterogeneity (Q308640): Difference between revisions

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+An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
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+Reserve price signaling
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+Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
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+Optimal allocation mechanisms with single-dimensional private information
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+On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
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+Auction and the informed seller problem
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+The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
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+The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
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+Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
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+Optimal Auction Design
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+Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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+Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
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+Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility
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+The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
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+On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
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+A note on the Seller's optimal mechanism in bilateral trade with two-sided incomplete information
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