On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget (Q2359380): Difference between revisions

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+Robust Mechanism Design
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+Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
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+An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
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+Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
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+Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
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+Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal?
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+Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
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+Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
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+Incentives in Teams
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+Robust trading mechanisms
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+Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
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+On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
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+Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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+Strategy-proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies
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