Social preferences and context sensitivity (Q1656977): Difference between revisions

From MaRDI portal
Import240304020342 (talk | contribs)
Set profile property.
ReferenceBot (talk | contribs)
Changed an Item
 
(One intermediate revision by one other user not shown)
Property / full work available at URL
 
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g8040043 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / OpenAlex ID
 
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2761838104 / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord? / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Test of the Consistency of Preferences for Altruism / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Testing theories of fairness-intentions matter / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Implications of trust, fear, and reciprocity for modeling economic behavior / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Promises and Partnership / rank
 
Normal rank
Property / cites work
 
Property / cites work: Psychological games and sequential rationality / rank
 
Normal rank

Latest revision as of 07:21, 16 July 2024

scientific article
Language Label Description Also known as
English
Social preferences and context sensitivity
scientific article

    Statements

    Social preferences and context sensitivity (English)
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    13 August 2018
    0 references
    Summary: This paper is a partial review of the literature on `social preferences'. There are empirical findings that convincingly demonstrate the existence of social preferences, but there are also studies that indicate their fragility. So how robust are social preferences, and how exactly are they context dependent? One of the most promising insights from the literature, in my view, is an equilibrium explanation of mutually referring conditional social preferences and expectations. I use this concept of equilibrium, summarized by means of a figure, to discuss a range of empirical studies. Where appropriate, I also briefly discuss a couple of insights from the (mostly parallel) evolutionary literature about cooperation. A concrete case of the Orma in Kenya will be used as a motivating example in the beginning.
    0 references
    social preferences
    0 references
    game theory
    0 references
    ethics
    0 references

    Identifiers

    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references
    0 references