Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium (Q5111113): Difference between revisions

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+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
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+Consistent Voting Systems
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+Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions
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+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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