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Latest revision as of 14:26, 27 July 2024

scientific article
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Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
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    Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms (English)
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    17 December 2021
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    resource sharing
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    cost sharing
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    implementation
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    envy-free
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    VCG mechanisms
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