Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (Q2138086): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 22:39, 28 July 2024

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Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
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    Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment (English)
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    11 May 2022
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    interdistrict school choice
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    student assignment
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    stability
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    diversity
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