Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining (Q806650): Difference between revisions
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Latest revision as of 09:04, 30 July 2024
scientific article
| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining |
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Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining (English)
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1991
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The author adresses the question of determining bargaining mechanisms for some set of decision problems which are independent of the status quo. The answer to this existence problem concludes with two impossibility theorems.
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bargaining mechanisms
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status quo
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impossibility theorems
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