Efficient money burning in general domains (Q506525): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B26
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6679573
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6679573 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+algorithmic mechanism design
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: algorithmic mechanism design / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+money burning
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: money burning / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+social welfare
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: social welfare / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+residual surplus
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: residual surplus / rank @@
+Normal rank
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@@ Property / Wikidata QID: Q59818364 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Frugal path mechanisms
@@ Property / cites work: Frugal path mechanisms / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Provision-After-Wait in Healthcare / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3524718
@@ Property / cites work: Q3524718 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Optimal Auction Design
@@ Property / cites work: Optimal Auction Design / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
@@ Property / cites work: Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5501329
@@ Property / cites work: Q5501329 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Auction design with a risk averse seller
@@ Property / cites work: Auction design with a risk averse seller / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient Money Burning in General Domains
@@ Property / cites work: Efficient Money Burning in General Domains / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3549687
@@ Property / cites work: Q3549687 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3549600
@@ Property / cites work: Q3549600 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Quasi-Proportional Mechanisms: Prior-Free Revenue Maximization
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DBLP publication ID @@
+journals/mst/FotakisTTZ16
@@ Property / DBLP publication ID: journals/mst/FotakisTTZ16 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:506525