A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea (Q472219): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.jet.2014.10.002
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.002 / rank @@
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@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID @@
+B68
@@ Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number @@
+6370840
@@ Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6370840 / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+school choice
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: school choice / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+deferred acceptance algorithm
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: deferred acceptance algorithm / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+Pareto efficiency
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: Pareto efficiency / rank @@
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@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords @@
+matching
@@ Property / zbMATH Keywords: matching / rank @@
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@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
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@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.10.002
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@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2030910507
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2030910507 / rank @@
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@@ Property / cites work @@
+A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
@@ Property / cites work: A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
@@ Property / cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof stochastic assignment
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof stochastic assignment / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup>
@@ Property / cites work: School Choice with Consent<sup>*</sup> / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
@@ Property / cites work: Axioms for Deferred Acceptance / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+On cores and indivisibility
@@ Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.JET.2014.10.002
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2014.10.002 / rank @@
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@@ links / mardi / name / links / mardi / name @@
+Publication:472219