Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power (Q370962): Difference between revisions
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Property / DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0140-3 / rank | |||
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This paper studies how relaxations in the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives are related to weakening dictatorship in Arrow's theorem. Information gathering costs are measured and associated with the presence of individuals whose preference is decisive in some instances. It is evaluated how much the scope of particular individual's power increases in step with a reduction in the amount of information on other alternatives that has to be gathered to socially order two alternatives. The concepts of sufficient and relevant sets of alternatives play a basic role in the analysis. A concept of conditional dictators is also proposed. The framework established allows for developing the analysis in terms of social choice functions as well as in terms of social welfare functions. | |||
Property / review text: This paper studies how relaxations in the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives are related to weakening dictatorship in Arrow's theorem. Information gathering costs are measured and associated with the presence of individuals whose preference is decisive in some instances. It is evaluated how much the scope of particular individual's power increases in step with a reduction in the amount of information on other alternatives that has to be gathered to socially order two alternatives. The concepts of sufficient and relevant sets of alternatives play a basic role in the analysis. A concept of conditional dictators is also proposed. The framework established allows for developing the analysis in terms of social choice functions as well as in terms of social welfare functions. / rank | |||
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Property / reviewed by | |||
Property / reviewed by: Annibal Parracho Sant'Anna / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14 / rank | |||
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Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID | |||
Property / Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B15 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH DE Number | |||
Property / zbMATH DE Number: 6209934 / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
Arrow's theorem | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's theorem / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
individual power | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: individual power / rank | |||
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information gathering | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: information gathering / rank | |||
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Property / zbMATH Keywords | |||
relevant alternatives | |||
Property / zbMATH Keywords: relevant alternatives / rank | |||
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Property / MaRDI profile type | |||
Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank | |||
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Property / full work available at URL | |||
Property / full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-013-0140-3 / rank | |||
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Property / OpenAlex ID | |||
Property / OpenAlex ID: W2046218597 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Nonbinary social choice for economic environments / rank | |||
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Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Arrovian Social Choice Correspondences / rank | |||
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Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Information and preference aggregation / rank | |||
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Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Q3626680 / rank | |||
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Property / cites work | |||
Property / cites work: Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem / rank | |||
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Property / DOI | |||
Property / DOI: 10.1007/S10058-013-0140-3 / rank | |||
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links / mardi / name | links / mardi / name | ||
Latest revision as of 15:37, 9 December 2024
scientific article
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English | Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power |
scientific article |
Statements
Relaxing IIA and the effect on individual power (English)
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20 September 2013
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This paper studies how relaxations in the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives are related to weakening dictatorship in Arrow's theorem. Information gathering costs are measured and associated with the presence of individuals whose preference is decisive in some instances. It is evaluated how much the scope of particular individual's power increases in step with a reduction in the amount of information on other alternatives that has to be gathered to socially order two alternatives. The concepts of sufficient and relevant sets of alternatives play a basic role in the analysis. A concept of conditional dictators is also proposed. The framework established allows for developing the analysis in terms of social choice functions as well as in terms of social welfare functions.
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Arrow's theorem
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individual power
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information gathering
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relevant alternatives
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