On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (Q485776): Difference between revisions

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-.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.009 / rank @@
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+.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.009
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2014.05.009 / rank @@
+Normal rank