Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness (Q647541): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1007/s00355-010-0479-0
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/s00355-010-0479-0 / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type @@
+MaRDI publication profile
@@ Property / MaRDI profile type: MaRDI publication profile / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0479-0
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2044854382
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2044854382 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Dictatorial domains
@@ Property / cites work: Dictatorial domains / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Voting by Committees
@@ Property / cites work: Voting by Committees / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
@@ Property / cites work: Strategy-proof social choice correspondences. / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Voting by committees under constraints
@@ Property / cites work: Voting by committees under constraints / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules
@@ Property / cites work: Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
@@ Property / cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of social choice functions
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of social choice functions / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
@@ Property / cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Kelly's conjecture
@@ Property / cites work: Kelly's conjecture / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4902563
@@ Property / cites work: Q4902563 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q5635232
@@ Property / cites work: Q5635232 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1007/S00355-010-0479-0
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1007/S00355-010-0479-0 / rank @@
+Normal rank