Spatial implementation (Q894629): Difference between revisions

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Latest revision as of 07:29, 10 December 2024

scientific article
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Spatial implementation
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    Spatial implementation (English)
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    2 December 2015
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    geometric median
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    Euclidean preferences
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    Nash implementation
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    Maskin monotonicity
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