The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (Q932763): Difference between revisions

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Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.05.013 / rank
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Property / cites work: On the Shapley-Scarf economy: The case of multiple types of indivisible goods / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods / rank
 
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Property / cites work: On cores and indivisibility / rank
 
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Property / cites work: Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods / rank
 
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Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.JMATECO.2007.05.013 / rank
 
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Latest revision as of 09:41, 10 December 2024

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The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible
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    The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible (English)
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    11 July 2008
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    coordinate-wise core
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    indivisible goods
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    second-best incentive compatibility
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    strategy-proofness
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