A simple selling and buying procedure (Q1601457): Difference between revisions

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-.1006/jeth.2000.2783
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2783 / rank @@
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+Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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+Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
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+Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
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+Q3066116
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+The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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+Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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+Q5721624
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+College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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+Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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+Non-cooperative matching games
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+Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
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+Cooperative outcomes through noncooperative games
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+A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
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+The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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+Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
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+A market to implement the core
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+The assignment game. I: The core
@@ Property / cites work: The assignment game. I: The core / rank @@
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@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1006/JETH.2000.2783
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1006/JETH.2000.2783 / rank @@
+Normal rank