Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision (Q1668517): Difference between revisions

@@ Property / DOI @@
-.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041 / rank @@
-Normal rank
@@ Property / full work available at URL @@
+https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041
+Normal rank
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID @@
+W2488801146
@@ Property / OpenAlex ID: W2488801146 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition             *
@@ Property / cites work: Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition * / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q3208356
@@ Property / cites work: Q3208356 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
+Normal rank
@@ Property / cites work @@
+Q4902563
@@ Property / cites work: Q4902563 / rank @@
+Normal rank
@@ Property / DOI @@
+.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.07.041
@@ Property / DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.07.041 / rank @@
+Normal rank